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First Impressions 
The following pages contain brief summaries of issues of first 
impression identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced 
between September 3, 2015 and January 31, 2016.  This collection, written 
by the members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized by circuit. 
Each summary briefly describes an issue of first impression, and is 
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the issue, not a 
comprehensive analysis.  This compilation makes no claim to be 
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting point. 
Preferred citation for the summaries below: First Impressions, 12 
SETON HALL CIR. REV. [n] (2016). 
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FIRST CIRCUIT 
Summers v. Fin. Freedom Acquisition LLC, 807 F.3d 351 (1st Cir. 
2015) 
QUESTION: The 1st Circuit questioned whether a “mortgage was 
unenforceable because the mortgagee had failed to file a claim in the 
decedent’s estate.”  Id. at 353. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “[b]ecause the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court has not addressed whether probate extinguishes a real 
estate mortgage, our task is to vaticinate how that court would likely rule 
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if faced with the issue.”  Id. at 356.  The court reasoned that “[t]he case 
law elsewhere, confirms our intuition that the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court, if faced with the question, would hold that the right to foreclose 
should be treated as separate and distinct from the right to collect the 
underlying debt.”  Id. at 358.  Moreover, the court noted that, “it follows 
that, in Rhode Island, a mortgagee need not make a monetary claim against 
an estate in probate proceedings in order to retain its in rem rights to 
proceed against the real property that secures the mortgage debt.”  Id.  The 
court went onto reason that, “[a]fter the decedent passed away and the 
mortgage balance remained unpaid, it was to the scaffold of property law 
that Financial Freedom turned.  It properly exercised its right of 
foreclosure, and that in rem proceeding was wholly independent of the 
probate process.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that it was its’ belief that “the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court, were it confronted with the question, would 
conclude that the failure to file a claim in the probate court would not bar 
a mortgagee holding a reverse mortgage on real property from collecting 
the balance due through the equitable remedy of foreclosure.”  Id. at 358.  
Finally, the court noted, “[t]he probate process does not extinguish a real 
estate mortgage but, rather, only extinguishes personal liability for the 
underlying debt.”  Id. 
 
United States ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp., 809 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2015) 
QUESTION: Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) is 
available to cure most kinds of defects in subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. 
at 3. 
ANALYSIS: The court explains that Rule 15(d) “prescribes that ‘the 
court may permit supplementation even though the original pleading is 
defective in stating a claim.’”  Id. at 5.  The court then stated that courts 
have generally read rule 15(d) to include defects in subject matter 
jurisdiction among the defects that may be corrected through a 
supplemental pleading.  Id. Additionally, the court cited several other 
circuits that agree with its conclusion.  Id.  The court further noted that “in 
federal question cases, courts have been careful not to import the time-of-
filing rule indiscriminately.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(d) is available to cure most kinds of defects in subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 3. 
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Whyte v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 463 (1st Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: “Whether third-degree assault as defined by [state] law, 
describes a ‘crime of violence’ under [18 U.S.C. § 16(a)].”  Id. at 467. 
ANALYSIS: To determine whether a state crime is categorically 
“violent,” courts implement a two-part test as required by Congress.  Id. at 
466.  Congress defines a “crime of violence” as: “(a) an offense that has 
as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a 
felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force 
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of 
committing the offense.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Since the offense in 
question was not a felony, the court limited its analysis to only part (a).  
Id.  While the court found the state statute satisfied the intent requirement 
of Congress’ test because it did not merely require recklessness or 
negligence, the 1st Circuit held that third-degree assault did not require the 
act of “physical” or “violent force.”  Id. at 468, 471–72. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit joined the 2nd Circuit holding that 
“third-degree assault as defined by [state] law, does not require proof of 
all the required elements of a ‘crime of violence’” and therefore cannot be 
categorically labeled as one.  Id. at 465. 
 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
 
EEOC v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 801 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether there is a proper scope of the federal courts 
power to review if the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) has fulfilled its pre-suit administrative obligations.  Id. at 100–
101. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit considered the prior case in which it was 
determined that Congress gave the federal courts this power.  Id. at 101.  
The court noted that in Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645 
(2015), the Supreme Court provided guidance for the scope of judicial 
review regarding the EEOC.  Id.  The Supreme Court further explained 
that judicial review in this regard is narrow and only serves to enforce 
statute requirements that the EEOC must abide.  Id.  The 2nd Circuit 
articulated that with this limited judicial review, the EEOC must show that 
it took steps to determine the creditability of allegations.  Id.  The court 
reasoned that the limited review respects the discretion of the EEOC, and 
reflects the desire for substantive results.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that there is a proper scope of a 
federal court’s power to review whether the EEOC has fulfilled its pre-suit 
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administrative obligations, albeit limited.  Id.  The court further held that 
the proper scope of judicial review is to determine whether the EEOC 
conducted an investigation.  Id. 
 
Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 802 F.3d 399 (2d Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether a foreign governmental entity is properly 
served notice of suit when notice is sent to the defendant government’s 
minister of foreign affairs via its embassy in Washington, DC.  Id. at 404. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the requirement of service is subject 
to the final clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3), which requires only that 
service be sent “to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs.”  Id.  The 
court reasoned that mailing the notice of suit to the foreign minister via the 
embassy in Washington, DC is proper because the statute is “silent as to 
any specific location where the mailing is to be addressed,” and “[i]f 
Congress had wanted to require that the mailing be sent to the head of the 
ministry of foreign affairs in the foreign county, it could have said so.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that the mailing by the plaintiff 
to the foreign government’s minister of foreign affairs at its embassy in 
Washington, DC “was consistent with the language of the statute and 
could reasonably be expected to result in delivery to the intended person.”  
Id. 
 
Morse v. Fusto, 804 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether the “general-verdict rule” is subject to waiver.  
Id. at 551. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit determined that the defendants failed to 
request that the district court submit to the jury a special verdict form or 
interrogatories on each set of facts in support of their legal theory of the case 
prior to jury deliberations.  Id. at 551–52.  Additionally, the defendants 
failed to object to the jury instructions or verdict sheet before the jury 
deliberated.  Id. at 552.  The 2nd Circuit explained that since the defendants 
did not take advantage of these other procedural remedies available under 
the Federal Rules, the defendants could not rely on the general-verdict rule.  
Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held the “general-verdict rule is subject 
to waiver, and that the defendants have waived their ability to invoke the rule.”  
Id. at 553. 
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Tann v. Bennett, 807 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether “a state custody order moots an International 
Child Abduction Remedies Act claim [“ICARA”].”  Id. at 53. 
ANALYSIS: The court first looked at the language of the Hague 
Convention, which states that “[t]he sole fact that a decision relating to 
custody has been given in or is entitled to recognition in the requested State 
shall not be a ground for refusing to return a child under this Convention.”  
Id. at 52 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court noted that the 
purpose of the Convention was “to prevent situations where a family 
member would remove a child to jurisdictions more favorable to [his or 
her] custody claims in order to obtain a right of custody from the 
authorities.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 2nd Circuit then 
relied on a 7th Circuit ruling which posited that, if a state custody order 
made an ICARA claim moot, it would go against the purpose of the 
Convention.  Id. at 53. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that a state’s custody order does 
not moot an ICARA claim because it “could encourage the jurisdictional 
gerrymandering that the Hague Convention was designed to prevent.”  Id. 
THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Brand Mktg. Grp. LLC. v. Intertek Testing Servs., NA., Inc., 801 F.3d 
347 (3d Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether punitive damages are available in negligent 
misrepresentation claims.  Id. at 358. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit began by analyzing a Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court case, Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 F.2d 766 
(Pa. 2005).  Id. at 358.  In Hutchison, it was determined that a plaintiff in a 
negligence case may undertake an additional burden of attempting to prove 
that the defendant’s conduct was both negligent and outrageous, therefore 
warranting punitive damages.  Id.  The 3rd Circuit noted that, despite the 
fact that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552B does not specifically warrant 
punitive damages for negligent misrepresentation claims, there is no 
indication that any specific tort falls outside the realm of those for which 
punitive damages may be awarded.  Id.  The court agreed with the opinion 
in Hutchinson, and found that there is no need to distinguish between 
negligent misrepresentation claims and all other negligence claims.  Id. at 
359. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “Hutchison generally permits 
a plaintiff to undertake the additional burden of proving the heightened 
culpability required to sustain a punitive damages claim . . . in negligent 
misrepresentation cases.”  Id. 
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G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C), which establishes a 
statute of limitations for the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA) claims of two years and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B), which allows 
claims for injuries up to two years prior to their discovery, collectively 
allow plaintiffs to bring claims under IDEA for injuries occurring up to 4 
years prior to filing the complaint.  Id. at 604. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the plain meaning of the 
contradictory statutes cannot be reconciled without “on the one hand, of 
ignoring swaths of the statutory text or, on the other, accepting a reading 
that is absurd on its face.”  Id. at 615.  The 3rd Circuit reasoned that since 
the statute of limitations appears multiple times throughout the federal act 
and the legislative history suggests that congress intended there to be a 
two-year statute of limitations, § 1415(f)(3)(C) had to be a mere 
restatement of § 1415(b)(6)(B)’s filing limitation rather than a 
contradictory allowance for additional claims to be brought.  Id. at 617–
23. 
   CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that claimants have only “two 
years from the date they knew or should have known of [an IDEA] 
violation to request a due process hearing through the filing of an 
administrative complaint.”  Id. at 626. 
 
Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Athena Venture Partners, L.P., 803 F.3d 144 
(3d Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether a party waives its right to seek vacatur of an 
award by waiting to challenge a panel member’s participation until after 
the award has been decided.  Id. at 147. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by stating that a general rule, where a 
party automatically waives its claim if it fails to raise concerns prior to 
arbitration, would be inappropriate.  Id. at 147.  The 3rd Circuit then 
proceeded to analyze the “constructive knowledge standard,” and how the 
court almost adopted this standard in a previous case.  Id. at 148–49.  The 
“constructive knowledge standard” requires parties to exercise “diligence 
and tenacity” in investigating potential conflicts when the party knew or 
should have known facts of misconduct.  Id. at 148. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that the losing party waived its 
right to vacate the award when it did not further investigate the panel 
member after receiving information about his legal troubles.  Id. at 150. 
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Grp. Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango Inc., 810 F.3d 116 (3d 
Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether the term “prosecuting” in the diligent 
prosecution bar “requires an agency enforcement action to be pending in 
court if it is to bar a citizen suit.”  Id. at 128. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that, “because the 2012 and 2014 
civil actions culminated in final judgments, they were not pending before 
a court when [the Group Against Smog and Pollution] GASP filed its 
citizen suit, and therefore the Consent Decrees from these actions could 
not support a diligent prosecution bar.”  Id.  The court then notes, “[t]his 
issue is one of first impression in this Court.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that, “[w]e have little difficulty 
in holding that when a state or federal agency diligently prosecutes an 
underlying action in court, the diligent prosecution bar will prohibit citizen 
suits during the actual litigation as well as after the litigation has been 
terminated by a final judgment, consent decree, or consent order and 
agreement.”  Id.  The court further notes that, “when a state or federal 
agency diligently pursues an ongoing consent decree that may be modified 
by the parties and enforced by the agency, the diligent prosecution bar will 
prohibit citizen suits.”  Id.  Applying the law to the case at hand the court 
states, “the parties in the present case were still able to modify or enforce 
the 2012 Consent Decree and 2014 Consent Order and Agreement and the 
district court correctly found that the [Allegheny County Health 
Department] ACHD was ‘diligently prosecuting’ the case by taking 
actions that furthered the goals of these Consent Decrees, which was 
compliance with the regulations.”  Id. 
 
Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2015)  
QUESTION: Whether religious classifications trigger heightened 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 299. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by acknowledging that although no 
“binding precedent” existed on this issue, it could be guided by “implicit” 
messages in Supreme Court decisions.  Id.  One such decision concluded 
“religious classifications are treated like others traditionally subject to 
heightened scrutiny, such as those based on race.”  Id.  (citing United 
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996)).  The court was also 
influenced by the 2nd, 8th, 9th and 10th Circuits which “subject[ed] 
religious-based classifications to heightened scrutiny.”  Id. at 300. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “intentional discrimination 
based on religious affiliation must survive heightened equal-protection 
review.”  Id. at 301. 
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In re Trump Entm’t Resorts Unite Here Local 54, 810 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 
2016)  
QUESTION: Whether “a Chapter 11 debtor-employer able to reject 
the continuing terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement 
(CBA) under [18 U.S.C.] § 1113 after the CBA has expired?”  Id. at 164. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit began by noting that “[t]his appeal 
requires us to resolve the effect of two potentially conflicting provisions 
of federal law.”  Id. at 163.  Describing the conflict, the court explained, 
“Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a Chapter 11 debtor to 
‘reject’ its CBAs under certain circumstances.  The National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) prohibits an employer from unilaterally changing 
the terms and conditions of a CBA even after its expiration.”  Id.  As a 
result, “under the NLRA, the key terms and conditions of an expired CBA 
continues to govern the relationship between a debtor-employer and its 
unionized employees until the parties reach a new agreement or bargain to 
impasse.”  Id. at 164.  The court read both “statutory frameworks seriatim, 
and assume[d] that Congress passed each subsequent law with full 
knowledge of the existing legal landscape.”  Id. at 167.  The court reasoned 
that the “when the employer’s statutory obligations to maintain the status 
quo under the terms of an expired CBA will undermine the debtor’s ability 
to reorganize and remain in business, it is the expertise of the Bankruptcy 
Court which is needed rather than that of the NLRB.  For that reason, 
whether the CBA is in effect or is expired, it is the Bankruptcy Court which 
should make the review and decide on the necessity of the modification.”  
Id. at 173. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held “that § 1113 applies to a CBA 
after it has expired.”  Id. 
 
J.B. v. Fassnacht, 801 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: “Whether the Supreme Court’s ruling in [Florence v. 
Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 
(2012)] extends to juvenile detainees.”  Id. at 342. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit stated that its analysis must balance the 
constitutional rights of the juvenile against the security interests of the 
detention facility.  Id.  The court further noted that the practice of 
preforming a strip search on juveniles before admitting them into the 
general population of the facility must be “reasonably related to legitimate 
peneological interests.”  Id.  The court reasoned that there is no easy way 
to differentiate the security risks posed by juvenile and adult detainees, 
noting further that when dealing with juvenile detainees the state is acting 
as the legal guardian and therefore the need to ensure the safety of all 
detainees is heightened.  Id. at 343.  The 3rd  Circuit went on to dismiss 
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the argument that such a practice should be subject to the reasonable 
suspicion standard previously applied by the Supreme Court because that 
case dealt with a strip-search in a school setting, and such an 
individualized standard could be subject to abuse in a juvenile detention 
facility.  Id. at 344. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that the policy of strip-searching 
juvenile detainees before releasing them into the general population of the 
juvenile detention facility was to be analyzed under the standards set forth 
by the Supreme Court in Florence.  Id. at 346. 
 
United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether The Mann Act precedent applies to 
prosecutions under 18 USCS § 2423(b), for the transportation of minors.  
Id. at 192. 
ANALYSIS: The court considered the language of both The Mann Act 
and 18 USCS § 2423(b).  Id.  The court noted that the crucial language of 
§ 2423(b) is the same language of the original Mann Act.  Id.  at 193.  This 
language is “for the purpose of” phrase.  Id.  The court reasoned that the 
relationship between § 2423(b) and the Mann Act suggests that Congress 
intended this phrase to have the same meaning in the two statutes.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that Mann Act precedent is 
instructive and persuasive in 18 USCS § 2423(b) cases.  Id. at 192. 
FOURTH CIRCUIT 
 
Hernandez-Zavala v. Lynch, 806 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether a conviction under a state law that does not 
have a domestic relationship as an element of the offense constitutes a 
“crime of domestic violence” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).  Id. at 
262–63. 
ANALYSIS: The court was charged with determining which approach 
was appropriate in determining whether a state conviction would 
constitute “crime of domestic violence” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).  
Id. at 263.  The court favored the “circumstance-specific” approach, which 
permits the court to consider underlying evidence of the conviction, 
thereby allowing the court to determine if a domestic relationship existed 
between the defendant and the victim.  Id.  The court found that this 
approach would be just, as the language of the state’s offense does not fit 
within the framework of the federal statute.  Id.  at 264.  The court found 
by means of the “circumstance-specific” approach that the Defendant did 
commit an act of violence and was in a domestic relationship with the 
victim.  Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit, using the “circumstance-specific” 
approach, held that the Defendant was in fact in a domestic relationship 
with the victim, thereby permitting a finding of domestic abuse satisfying 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).  Id. at 268. 
 
Rich v. United States, 811 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether “the discretionary function exception to the” 
Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) applies to prison officials’ decisions 
regarding “prisoner placement and the handling of threats posed by 
inmates against one another.”  Id. at 145. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th Circuits 
have all held that prison officials receive discretion under the FTCA.  Id.  
The court posited that “[p]rison officials are afforded discretion in 
determining where to place inmates and whether to keep certain 
individuals or gangs separated from one another.”  Id. at 146.  The court 
further reasoned that “because these decisions invoke several policy 
considerations for prison administrators, they are precisely the kind of 
determinations that the discretionary function exception is intended to 
protect.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that “the discretionary function 
exception shields the prison officials from liability with respect to whether 
they should have separated [a prisoner] from his attackers.”  Id. 
 
FIFTH CIRCUIT  
 
Bender v. United States Parole Comm’n, 802 F.3d 690 (5th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION ONE: Whether the Parole Commission can impose a 
sentence, a term of imprisonment, and supervised release that exceeds a 
foreign sentence.  Id. at 694. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit looked at the Domestic statutory law that 
sets the parameters for incarceration of prisoners transferred from foreign 
countries under the Transfer Treaty.  Id.    The court noted that Congress 
has imposed a temporal limitation on the Parole Commission’s discretion 
so that the combined periods of imprisonment and supervised release that 
result from such determination shall not exceed the term of imprisonment 
imposed by the foreign court on that offender.  Id.  The 5th Circuit stated 
that the “as though language” in the statute is ambiguous, and thus, as a 
result, the court must defer to the Commission’s reasonable interpretation 
of the provision.  Id. at 695.  Therefore, time served rather than time 
sentenced is the appropriate measure of a prisoner’s total time under 
federal supervision, and must not exceed the foreign sentence.  Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit joined the 9th and 7th Circuit by 
holding that “[a]lthough the foreign sentence serves as a cap on the amount 
of time a transferred prisoner may serve, it does not operate precisely as a 
statutory maximum under federal sentencing law.”  Id. at 695–96. 
QUESTION TWO:  Whether a sentence that is indeterminate 
discredits good time credit?  Id. at 694. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit again looked at the applicable 
regulations, and stated that “the regulation is consistent with the purposes 
of the Treaty and the statute because it prevents a transferred prisoner’s 
sentence from being longer than his original sentence and allows the 
prisoner the benefit of an earlier release from imprisonment, but also 
ensures that the sentence is not shorter in duration than the original 
sentence.”  Id. at 696. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit once again aligned itself with the 9th 
Circuit by holding that the purpose of the Parole Commission is to ensure 
that the remaining sentence does not exceed a prisoner’s original sentence.  
Id.  Moreover, “where the period of supervised release would otherwise 
exceed the duration of the original sentence, supervised release terminates 
when the full term of the original sentence is completed.”  Id. 
Gibson v. United States, 809 F.3d 807 (5th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether the discretionary function exception applies to 
a government agency under the Federal Tort Claims Act.  Id. at 811. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by first determining whether the actions 
at issue before the court were discretionary in nature.  Id. at 811–12.  The 
5th Circuit left the matter unresolved reasoning that it was unclear.  Id. at 
813.  The court continued by examining whether policy reasons supported 
a discretionary exception.  Id.  The court looked to decisions by the 3rd 
and 9th Circuit for its analysis.  Id. at *813–14.  Based on the decisions of 
these circuits, the 5th Circuit determined that the discretionary function is 
not appropriate when the government is acting as a business.  Id. at 815. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that the discretionary function 
does not apply where the government is acting as a business.  Id. 
 
Hartfield v. Osborne, 808 F. 3d. 1066 (5th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether 28 U.S.C.S. §2254 governs a habeas 
application when the petitioner is currently in custody pursuant to a state 
court judgment, but was not at the time of filing.  Id. at *1072. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit found the 10th Circuit case, Yellowbear 
v. Wyoming Attorney General, 525 F.3d 921, 922–25 (10th Cir. 2008) 
instructive in their analysis.  Id.  The court also discussed the differences 
between a § 2241 motion, and a § 2254 motion, noting that § 2241 
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challenges pretrial detention, whereas a § 2254 petition is the proper 
avenue for attacking the validity of a conviction and sentence.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that the plain language of § 2254 
includes petitioner’s current petition for a writ, because petitioner is 
currently in custody pursuant to a state court judgment and any habeas writ 
that issues from a federal court at the present time would necessarily 
release him from custody pursuant to a state court judgment.  Id. at 1071–
72. 
 
Seth B. v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 810 F.3d 961 (5th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether the phrase “hear additional evidence at the 
request of a party,” under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA), requires a district court to hold an evidentiary hearing where 
witnesses testify and are cross-examined.  Id. at 966. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit found that the text of the IDEA itself does 
not require such a hearing.  Id. at 970.  The court further stated that the 
district court did not decide the case on the basis of the administrative 
record alone.  Id. at 973.  The district court in fact received additional 
evidence in the form of exhibits, affidavits, and depositions, and it held 
oral argument on the motion for summary judgment.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit concluded that an evidentiary hearing 
was not required.  Id. 
 
United States v. Churchwell, 807 F.3d 107 (5th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: “[W[hether a government agent may be held criminally 
liable for aiding and abetting where he accepts or certifies as true 
another’s passport application that he knew contained false statements.”  
Id. at 115. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[a]s a general rule, a defendant 
is guilty of aiding and abetting if he knowingly associated himself with 
and participated in the criminal venture.”  Id.  (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  The court noted that “[o]ther circuits have 
considered whether aiding and abetting includes certifying and accepting 
false statements,” and that the 9th Circuit has upheld a conviction for 
aiding and abetting passport fraud.  Id. at 116. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that a government agent may be 
held criminally liable for aiding and abetting if he “accepts or certifies as 
true another’s passport application that he knew contained false 
statements.”  Id. at 115–16. 
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SIXTH CIRCUIT 
 
Kitchen v. Heyns, 802 F.3d 873 (6th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether or not the 6th Circuit has appellate jurisdiction 
over an appeal from a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 21 order 
dismissing some but not all of the defendants in a lawsuit.  Id. at 874. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by interpreting the language of Rule 21 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Id.  Rule 21 applies when a party 
improperly adds or omits other parties in a lawsuit.  Id.  Under Rule 21, a 
court may (1) add or drop parties; or (2) sever the claims against the 
parties.  Id.  In this case, the defendants asked the court to drop fifteen of 
the twenty-two joined parties.  Id.  Pursuant to Rule 21, the court granted 
their demand and dismissed them without prejudice.  Id.  The court 
explained that when claims are severed, a plaintiff may appeal that 
judgment.  Id. at 875.  The court noted that in this particular case, the court 
did not sever claims, but simply removed parties without a judgment; and 
therefore the plaintiff may not appeal this decision.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that they did not have appellate 
jurisdiction and therefore dismissed the appeal.  Id. at 876. 
 
Kreipke v. Wayne State Univ., 807 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether a state university is a state agency, entitled to 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and therefore not a “person” 
subject to liability under the False Claims Act (FCA).  Id. at 776. 
ANALYSIS: The court posited that the circuits that have decided this 
issue, namely the 4th, 5th, 9th, 10th and 11th Circuits, have unanimously 
held that the proper test to determine whether an entity is an “arm of the 
state,” for purposes of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment, is the four-factor Ernst test.  Id. at 775.  The court reasoned 
that the definition of “person” under the FCA “parallels the limitations on 
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment[.]”  Id.  The court 
followed in line with the other circuits in holding that the Ernst test was 
the proper examination for determining state liability under the FCA.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that, based on a test 
implemented unanimously by other circuits, the university was an arm of 
the state and therefore not a “person” subject to liability under the FCA.  
Id. at 781. 
 
Mokdad v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 807 (6th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction 
to hear a plaintiff’s direct challenge to his placement on a no-fly list by the 
236 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 12:223 
Terrorist Screening Center, along with his challenge to the adequacy of 
the procedure to contest his inclusion on the no-fly list.  Id. at 808. 
ANALYSIS: 49 U.S.C.S. § 46110 makes it clear that the Federal Court 
of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction to review the orders of some federal 
agencies such as the TSA.  Id. at 809.  The district court found that while 
the Terrorist Screening Center was not included in §46110, the doctrine of 
“inescapable intertwinement” allows the order by the Terrorist Screening 
Center to be covered due to its relationship with the TSA orders.  Id. at 
810.  The doctrine of inescapable intertwinement specifies that special 
review statutes such as §46110 apply to “challenges to orders by a covered 
agency [and] to claims inescapably intertwined with an order by a covered 
agency.”  Id.  The 6th Circuit disagreed with this view because such an 
expansive view “would run the risk of inadvertently expanding the number 
and range of agency orders that might fall under exclusive-jurisdiction 
provisions that Congress did not intend to sweep so broadly.”  Id. at 815.  
The 6th Circuit reasoned that the doctrine of inescapable intertwinement 
could not be extended to orders made by an agency not included in the 
statute, as was the case with the Terrorist Screening Center’s order to place 
the defendant on the no fly list.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that the Federal Court of Appeals 
did not have exclusive jurisdiction over a challenge to a placement on a 
no-fly list and the district court does have subject matter jurisdiction over 
the issue.  Id.  Furthermore, the 6th Circuit declined to answer the question 
whether § 46110 would deprive the district court of subject matter 
jurisdiction to a challenge of the adequacy of the redress process and 
dismissed the claim without prejudice.  Id. 
 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
 
Atl. Cas. Ins. Co. v. GTL, Inc., No. 13-35133, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 
22602 (9th Cir. Dec. 24, 2015)  
QUESTION: “Whether, in a case involving a claim of damages by a 
third party, an insurer who does not receive timely notice according to the 
terms of an insurance policy must demonstrate prejudice from the lack of 
notice to avoid defense and indemnification of the insured.”  Id. *2. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit began by certifying this issue of first 
impression to the Montana Supreme Court pursuant to Montana Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 15(3) because it involved a controlling question of 
state law.  Id.  As a result, “[t]he Montana Supreme Court accepted 
jurisdiction of the certified question and [] rendered its decision.”  Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The Montana Supreme Court found “an insurer who 
does not receive timely notice according to the terms of an insurance 
policy must demonstrate prejudice from the lack of notice to avoid defense 
and indemnification of the insured.”  Id. 
 
Bradford v. Scherschligt, 803 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether the statute of limitations for an action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 based upon the deliberate fabrication of evidence runs from 
the time of the vacated conviction or ultimate acquittal.  Id. at 384. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit analogized this question of law to the 
common law tort which it found closely resembled the issue of malicious 
prosecution.  Id. at 387–88.  The court noted that the statute of limitations 
for malicious prosecution begins at the point when “the proceedings 
against the plaintiff have [been] terminated in such a manner that they 
cannot be revived.”  Id. at 388.  The court further stated that it is both 
practical and logical to follow the statute of limitations for malicious 
prosecution and set the triggering date as the day of acquittal.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit determined that because a plaintiff’s 
proceedings terminate at acquittal, this is the appropriate statute of 
limitations period.  Id. 
 
 
 
Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 810 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether “in considering an award of attorney fees under 
42 U.S.C. § 1988, it is appropriate to take into consideration a plaintiff’s 
success in obtaining a settlement against another party arising out of the 
same facts.”  Id. at 662. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit noted that the first thing that courts do 
when determining the amount of reasonable attorney fees is to apply the 
lodestar method to determine what is reasonable.  Id. at 665–66.  Then the 
district court may adjust the lodestar based on a variety of factors including 
degree of success obtained by the plaintiffs.  Id. at 666.  The Supreme 
Court has held that that degree of success is “the most critical factor” in 
determining reasonableness.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a district court may, “within 
the exercise of its discretion, consider the damages portion of a settlement 
payment by other defendants in evaluating a plaintiff’s degree of success,” 
however, it should do so only if plaintiff’s counsel’s time spent on settling 
cannot be separated from the time spent on non-settling.  Id. at 666–67. 
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Costa Brava P’ship III LP v. ChinaCast Educ. Corp. (In re ChinaCast 
Educ. Corp. Sec. Litig.), 809 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether an employee’s acts of fraud may be imputed to 
his employer even when those acts were against the interest of the 
employer.  Id. at 472. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by first noting that “[f]ederal securities 
law, embodied in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934”, under which the claim was brought, “creates an extensive 
scheme of civil liability.”  Id. at 474 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The court reasoned that because the federal securities law does not provide 
explicit rules for corporate liability, agency principles should apply.  Id. at 
475–76.  The 9th Circuit looked at the principle of imputation which 
establishes liability for an employer based on acts performed within the 
scope of employment.  Id. at 476.  The court applied the principle of 
imputation to the issue at hand, noting that other courts have also followed 
agency principles.  Id. at 475–76. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that employers may be liable for 
an employee’s actions that occur within the scope of employment when 
taking the action.  Id. at 473. 
 
Dorrance v. United States, 807 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a life insurance policyholder has any basis 
in a mutual life insurance company’s membership rights.”  Id. at 1211. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that over the late 1990s and early 2000s 
there had been a trend towards the “demutualization” of mutual life 
insurance companies.  Id.  “As many mutual insurance companies 
transformed into stock companies, the surplus resulting from the sale of 
shares in the company was divided among current policy holders, often in 
the form of stocks.”  Id.  The court stated that plaintiffs received and then 
sold the stock derived from the demutualization of life insurance 
companies they had policies from.  Id.  The plaintiffs asserted a zero cost 
basis in the stock and paid tax on the gain, while later claiming a full refund 
on the taxes paid on sale of stock since the stock “represented a return of 
previously paid policy premiums or because their mutual rights were no 
capable of valuation.”  Id.  The court further noted that the government 
took the position that they were not entitled to a refund.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the IRS properly rejected 
their refund claim because the plaintiffs offered “nothing to show payment 
for their stake in the membership rights, as opposed to premium payments 
for the underlying insurance coverage.”  Id. at 1219. 
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HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Blendheim, 803 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: “Whether [a] bankruptcy court [may] properly void[] [a 
creditor’s] lien pursuant to [11 U.S.C.] § 506(d)” when the creditor fails 
to timely respond to a debtor’s objection.  Id. at 482, 489. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that the language of § 506(d) 
unequivocally expressed Congress’s “clear and manifest purpose [] to 
nullify a creditor’s legal rights in a debtor’s property if the creditor’s claim 
is not allowed, or disallowed.”  Id.  at 489.  Here, the bankruptcy court did 
not allow a creditor to prosecute its claim because the creditor failed to 
timely respond to the debtor’s objection under § 506(d).  Id.  at 481–82.  
The court’s plain interpretation of § 506(d) led it to hold that the claim’s 
associated lien is also void under the statute.  Id. at 482.  Furthermore, the 
court and parties agreed that neither of the two exceptions specified in 
§ 506(d) applied to the facts of the case.  Id. at 489. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a bankruptcy court may void 
a lien pursuant to § 506(d) when the creditor fails to timely respond a 
debtor’s objection.  Id. at 501. 
 
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether copyright holders are required by 17 U.S.C. 
§512(c)(3)(A)(v) to determine whether material that potentially infringes 
on the respective copyright is considered a fair use of the copyright under 
17 U.S.C. §107 prior to issuing a takedown notification.  Id. at 1131–32. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit explained that 17 U.S.C. §512 
(c)(3)(A)(v) requires a takedown notification to include “a statement that 
the complaining party has a good faith belief that the use of the material 
in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its 
agent, or the law.”  Id. at 1129.  The court noted that the key to whether 
fair use must be considered by a copyright holder is whether fair use is an 
authorization under the law as contemplated by the statute.  Id. at 1132.  
Since Title 17 (Copyrights) does not define the term “authorize,” the 9th 
Circuit looked to the common meaning.  Id. at 1133.  The 9th Circuit 
pointed out that Black’s Law Dictionary defines “authorize as “[t]o give 
legal authority,” “formally approve,” or “empower.”  Id. (citing Authorize, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)).  Therefore, 17 U.S.C. §107 
“‘empowers and formally approves’ the use of copyrighted material if the 
use constitutes fair use.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit determined that the provisions of 17 
U.S.C. §107 have created a form of “non-infringing use” because fair use 
is authorized by the law.  Id. at 1133.  Accordingly, a holder of a copyright 
“must consider the existence of fair use before sending a takedown 
notification” permitted by 17 U.S.C. §512(c).  This demonstrates that, at 
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least for purposes of 17 U.S.C. §512(f), fair use must be treated differently 
than other traditional affirmative defenses found in copyright law.  Id. 
 
Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether an inmate has exhausted administrative 
remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, if his grievance is decided on the merits 
at all available levels of administrative review despite failure to comply 
with a procedural rule.  Id. at 656. 
ANALYSIS: When prison officials decide not to enforce a procedural 
rule, but instead decide an inmate’s grievance on the merits, then officials 
have had an opportunity to correct any claimed deprivation, and an 
administrative record supporting the prison’s decision has been developed.  
Id. at 658.  Dismissing the inmate’s claim for failure to exhaust does not 
advance the statutory goal of avoiding unnecessary interference in prison 
administration.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a prisoner exhausts all 
administrative remedies despite “failing to comply with a procedural rule 
if prison officials ignore the procedural problem and render a decision on 
the merits of the grievance at each available step of the administrative 
process.”  Id. 
 
Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether the preemption provided for in the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) extends to preempt California state law against 
waiving of claims pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) 
of 2004.  Id. at 427. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit began its analysis by noting that the 
California Supreme Court held in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los 
Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348 (2014), that pre-dispute agreements to 
waive PAGA claims are unenforceable under California Law.  Id., at 429.  
Continuing with its analysis, the 9th Circuit noted that the FAA “was 
enacted in 1925 in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements.”  Id.  Therefore, the 9th  Circuit reasoned that the Iskanian 
opinion does not conflict with the FAA, because it gave no preference to 
litigation over arbitration.  Id. at 433. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit determined that no preemption is 
necessary because the Iskanian opinion does not conflict with the 
legislative purpose of the FAA.  Id. at 434. 
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Sung Kil Jang, No. 11-73587, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 22311 (9th Cir. 
Dec. 22, 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether “section 302 of the North Korean Human 
Rights Act of 2004 (the Act), 22 U.S.C. § 7842, preclude[s] a finding that 
a North Korean has ‘firmly resettled’ in South Korea . . . even though he 
otherwise meets the requirements of firm resettlement?”  Id. at *2. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “the text of the Act contains no 
reference to firm resettlement,” and that “the firm resettlement statute and 
regulation do not refer to nationality or require an analysis of the asylum 
applicant’s nationality.”  Id. at *12.  The court noted that the regulation 
merely asks whether the individual has received an offer of some sort of 
permanent status.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that 22 U.S.C. § 7842 is clear 
and does not affect “the analysis of whether a North Korean has ‘firmly 
resettled’ in South Korea (or anywhere else).”  Id. at *11–12. 
 
Talaie v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 808 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g), which “requires a creditor 
who obtains a mortgage loan by sale or transfer to notify the borrower of 
the transfer in writing,” applies retroactively.  Id. at 411. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by stating that there exists 
in American jurisprudence a deeply rooted presumption against the 
“retroactive application of statutes.”  Id. at 411–12.  Citing the Supreme 
Court, the court explained that “the legal effect of conduct should 
ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took 
place [in order] to avoid the unfairness of imposing new burdens on 
persons after the fact.”  Id. at 412 (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  The court then raised the specific problems that may arise from 
the retroactive application of § 1641(g), including but not limited to: (1) 
the impairment of the rights creditors possessed when they acted, (2) the 
“increasing [of creditors’] liability for past conduct,” and (3) the 
“imposi[tion of] new duties on transactions already completed.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Given the problems the retroactive 
application of § 1641(g) may create and given that Congress never 
expressed a clear intent to apply to statute retroactively, the court held that 
the statute does not apply retroactively.  Id. at 413. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held “§ 1641(g) does not apply 
retroactively.”  Id. 
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Transbay Auto Serv. v. Chevron USA Inc., 807 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 
2015) 
QUESTION: Whether “when a party acts in conformity with the 
contents of a document, such an action constitutes an adoption of the 
statements contained therein even if the party never” reviewed the 
document’s contents, used the document, or relied on the document.”  Id. 
at 1118. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by reiterating its possession test to 
determine adoption of a statement under FRE Rule 801(d)(2)(B).  Id. at 
1119.  The court then noted that this circuit and all other circuits which 
decided this issue previously held that a party, who relies on a third-party 
document by submitting the document to another, after reviewing its 
contents, constitutes an adoptive admission.  Id.  The court noted that the 
key difference between these previous holdings and the issue before the 
court in this case rested on whether a party adopts a statement regardless 
of if that party reviewed the statement prior to handing it over to a third 
party.  Id. at 1120.  The court explained that, “we do not look to whether 
the party has affirmatively reviewed the document, but whether ‘the 
surrounding circumstances tie the possessor and the document together in 
some meaningful way.’”  Id. at 1121 (quoting Pilgrim v. Trustees of Tufts 
College, 118 F.3d 864 (1st Cir. 1997)).  Here, the party gave an 
independent appraisal to a lender to secure a commercial loan.  Id. at 1118.  
The court articulated that this constitutes an adoption of the statements 
made within the appraisal, regardless of whether the party reviewed the 
appraisal prior to submitting it to the lender to consider.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the distinction between a 
party that personally reviewed the third-party content before submitting it 
to another and one that did not, is irrelevant as to its admissibility.  Id. at 
1120. 
 
United States v. James, 810 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 2016) 
QUESTION: What constitutes physical incapacity under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2242(2)(B).  Id. at 676. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit found support in differentiating the 
broader “physically incapable” standard from the narrower “physically 
helpless” standard, which was relied upon by the district court when it 
looked to federal applications of § 2242(2)(B).  Id. at 679.  For example, 
in the past, it had been held, in the context of sentencing, that a defendant 
had committed an act in violation of § 2242 where the victim “repeatedly 
gained and lost consciousness” and “was unconscious or nearly so” when 
the defendant engaged in intercourse with her.  Id. at 681.  These federal 
cases support the “physically incapable” standard by indicating that a 
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defendant may be convicted under § 2242(2)(B) where the victim had 
some awareness of the situation and—while not completely physically 
helpless—was physically hampered due to sleep, intoxication, or drug use 
and thereby rendered physically incapable.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “physically incapable” 
under § 2242(2)(B) should be defined broadly and not confused with the 
narrower “physically helpless” standard employed by the district court.  Id. 
at 679. 
 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
 
A.F. v. Espanola Pub. Schs., 801 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether a claimant may sue under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (IDEA) when her allegations in her federal court 
complaint and those in her original administrative complaint are nearly 
identical, and where said claimant has failed to exhaust available 
administrative remedies.  Id. at 1246. 
ANALYSIS: The 10th  Circuit recognized that “it’s often possible to 
pursue claims under the IDEA and other federal statutes seriatim just as 
[a] plaintiff wishes to do.”  Id.  The court noted, however, that there is a 
caveat that “except that before the filing of a civil action . . .  seeking relief 
that is also available under [IDEA], the procedures under subsections (f) 
and (g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the 
action been brought under the [IDEA].”  Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)).  
The 10th Circuit went on to explain that a plaintiff must first exhaust the 
procedures set forth in subsections (f) and (g) to the same extent as would 
be required under the IDEA, prior to seeking alternative forms of relief.  
Id. at 1248–49.  The court emphasized that mediation where the party 
settles is not what true meaning of exhausting all administrative 
procedures available.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that the plaintiff’s claim must 
be dismissed because she failed to exhaust all available administrative 
remedies prior to initiating her suit in federal court.  Id. at 1254. 
 
Grynberg v. Kinder Morgan Energy, L.P., 805 F.3d 901 (10th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether the lower court erred in concluding it lacked 
diversity jurisdiction holding that the citizenship of a Master Limited 
Partnership’s (MLP) consists of its unitholders’ citizenship.  Id. at 903. 
ANALYSIS: The Supreme Court has held an unincorporated entity’s 
citizenship is typically determined by its members’ citizenship (the 
“Chapman rule”).  Id. at 905–06.  The court has characterized the 
244 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 12:223 
Chapman rule as a “doctrinal wall,” and has applied it to joint stock 
companies, limited partnership associations, labor unions, and limited 
partnerships.  Id. at 905.  The court first reasoned, the long-standing rule 
guiding the jurisdictional citizenship of unincorporated entities, most 
recently stated in [Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 185, 195, 110 
S. Ct. 1015, 108 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1990)], applies to MLPs.  Id. at 905.  The 
court explained that the narrow exception to this rule does not apply.  Id.  
Finally, the court reasoned that the Grynbergs’ policy arguments are 
appropriately addressed by Congress, not the courts.  Id.  at 908. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that an MLP’s citizenship 
consists of its unitholders’ citizenship.  Id. 
 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 801 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Ex parte Young doctrine applies when a 
state sues a tribal official under 18 U.S.C. § 1166 seeking to enjoin class 
III gaming.”  Id. at 1289. 
ANALYSIS: The Ex parte Young doctrine “recognize[s] an exception 
to sovereign immunity lawsuits against state officials for prospective 
declaratory or injunctive relief to stop ongoing violations of federal law,” 
but if Congress creates a detailed remedial scheme to show its intent to 
displace the Ex parte Young doctrine, then the doctrine does not apply to 
the statute.  Id. at 1288–89.  The court reasoned that Congress did not 
create a remedial scheme in § 1166, and “[i]n the absence of such remedial 
regime,” the court could not ascertain Congress’s intent to displace the Ex 
parte Young doctrine as applied to § 1166.  Id. 1289–90. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “the Ex parte Young 
doctrine applies to a claim under § 1166.”  Id. at 1289. 
QUESTION TWO: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1166 provides states with “an 
express or implied [federal] right of action to sue tribal officials to enjoin 
unlawful gaming on Indian lands.”  Id. at 1293. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit noted that the existence of an expressed 
or implied statutory right to a cause of action is a question of statutory 
construction, and the statutory text, structure, and history should be 
examined to determine if such right exists.  Id. at 1293–94.  The court 
noted that “§ 1166 lacks any language explicitly creating a federal cause 
of action for a state to sue to enforce its laws.”  Id. at 1294.  The court 
stated that for § 1166 to create an implied right of action, there must be 
clear evidence that Congress intended to create such right.  Id.  The court 
reasoned that “[u]nlike statutes that contain right-creating language, 
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§ 1166 does not identify a class of persons or entities protected under the 
statute.”  Id. at 1297.  The court also reasoned that because § 1166 “has no 
provision explicitly creating a federal remedy for violation of a state civil 
law,” the court “must presume [that the omission of a remedial scheme 
had] to have been intentional.”  Id. at 1299.  The court then noted it was 
“Congress’ stated intent that under the [Indian Gaming Regulatory Act] 
the federal government would be the principal authority regulating Indian 
gaming.”  Id.  The court further stated that the legislative history shows 
that in creating the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Congress intended to 
strike a balance between the federal, state and tribal interests, and to strike 
such balance, Congress put limits on the application of state laws to tribal 
land.  Id. at 1300. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit concluded “that § 1166 does not 
provide states with either an express or implied right of action to sue tribal 
officials to enjoin unlawful gaming on Indian lands.”  Id. at 1293. 
 
Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether “a person who downloads and uses a free 
mobile application on his smartphone to view freely available content, 
without more, is a . . . ’subscriber’ (and therefore . . . a ‘consumer’) under 
the” Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2710.  Id. at 1252. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its statutory analysis by examining the 
ordinary meaning of the word “subscriber.”  Id. at 1255.  The court noted 
that “[a]lthough most definitions of ‘subscribe’ or ‘subscriber’ involve 
payment of some sort, not all do.”  Id. at 1256.  Consequently, the court 
found that payment is only one of the factors a court should consider to 
determine whether an individual constitutes a “subscriber” under the 
VPPA.  Id.  The court also noted that the dictionary definitions of the word 
“subscriber” have the common thread of subscriptions involving some sort 
of “commitment, relationship, or association (financial or otherwise) 
between a person and an entity.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that a person who merely 
downloads and uses a mobile application on their smartphone, at no cost, 
to freely view available content is not a “subscriber,” nor a “consumer,” 
under the VPPA.  Id. at 1252. 
 
Quinlan v. Sec’y, United States DOL, No. 14-12347, 2016 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 207 (11th Cir. Jan. 8, 2016) 
QUESTION: Whether it is appropriate to impute a supervisor’s 
knowledge of a subordinate employee’s violative conduct to his employer 
under Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) when the 
supervisor himself is involved in violative conduct.  Id. at *2. 
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ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit found that there was no difference 
between this case and the classic case of a supervisor’s knowledge being 
imputed to an employer that occurs “when the supervisor is on the scene 
looking on, sees the subordinate employee violating a safety rule, knows 
there is such a violation, but nonetheless allows it to continue.”  Id. at *20.  
The court noted that in both this case and the classic case, the supervisor 
sees the violation of the subordinate, has knowledge a violation is 
occurring, but nevertheless disregards the safety rule for some reason.  Id.  
Furthermore, there is no fundamental unfairness in imputing knowledge 
of the violation to employer because the secretary of the Department of 
Labor (the secretary) is not relieved of her burden of proving knowledge.  
Id. at *21.  The court determined that the secretary still has the burden of 
proving employer knowledge either through the supervisor’s actual or 
constructive knowledge or an employer’s actual or constructive 
knowledge of the employee’s misconduct.  Id.  at *21–22.  In other words, 
proof of the subordinate employee’s misconduct does not prove the 
employer had knowledge of the misconduct.  Id. at *22. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that it is appropriate to impute 
a supervisor’s knowledge of a subordinate’s violative conduct to the 
employer when the supervisor himself is engaging in violative conduct.  
Id. at *23. 
 
Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John v. Fla. Priory of the 
Knights Hospitallers of the Sovereign Order of Saint John, 809 F.3d 
1171 (11th Cir. 2015)   
QUESTION: The 11th Circuit addressed the issue of whether “the 
statutory defenses in 15 U.S.C.S. §1115(b) of the Lanham Act defeated 
the presumption of strength [the 11th Circuit] identified in [Dieter v. B&H 
Industries of Southwest Florida, Inc., 880 F.2d 322, 329 (11th Cir. 
1989)]?”  Id. at 1185. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit began by analyzing the text of the 
Lanham Act.  Id.  The court noted that §1115(b) of the statute, the 
“defenses or defects” section, rebutted “conclusive evidence of the right 
to use the registered mark.”  Id.  The court found the section implicated 
the validity factor of infringement and in Dieter the presumption went to 
the second element “of infringement—confusion.”  Id.  Thus, the court 
could not “treat the defenses in §1115(b) as defenses to the presumption 
we recognized in Dieter without overriding the plain language of the 
Lanham Act.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit found that “[a]lthough Dieter itself 
is in conflict with the statute,” the court declined to extend its error any 
further than necessary.”  Id. 
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United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the vagueness doctrine of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the advisory Sentencing 
Guidelines.”  Id. at 1189. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit began by examining the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).  Id. 
at 1193–94.  In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause 
of the Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague.  Id. at 
1193.  However, the 11th Circuit noted that Johnson was confined to 
“criminal statutes that define elements of a crime or fix punishments.”  Id.  
at 1194.  Importantly, the court found that the advisory Sentencing 
Guidelines neither fixes a punishment nor defines an element of a crime.  
Id.  Further, the court reasoned that, unlike a criminal statute, a sentencing 
judge possesses the ability to exercise discretion when administering the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Id.  Lastly, because the Sentencing Guidelines are 
only “advisory,” defendants have no expectation of relying on them to 
“communicate the sentence the district court will impose.”  Id.  Thus, there 
can be no constitutional right to a less discretionary set of Sentencing 
Guidelines.  Id. at 1194–95. 
   CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the advisory Sentencing 
Guidelines.  Id. at 1196. 
 
United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597 (11th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether the district court exceeded its authority under 
the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) of 1996, by using Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) to eliminate a defendant’s obligation to 
jointly and severally pay mandated restitution.  Id. at 598. 
ANALYSIS: The court considered at the language of the MVRA, 
which mandates restitution for certain crimes despite any other provision 
of law.  Id. at 599.  The court held that the congressional intent of the 
MVRA was to trump Rule 35.  Id.  The court found further evidence of 
such a congressional intent as the MVRA provides an exhaustive list of 
the ways in which a mandatory restitution can be modified, none of which 
include modification for Rule 35.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that the district court did not 
have the legal authority to eliminate a defendant’s restitution obligation 
based on a Rule 35(b) motion as the MVRA was intended to trump Rule 
35.  Id. at 610. 
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Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether § 4(a)(2) of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) authorizes disparate 
impact claims by applicants for employment.  Id. at 1290. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by interpreting the plain language of 
§ 4(a)(2).  Id. at 1292.  The court stated that “[i]f the language is clear, 
then our inquiry ends.  If the language is unclear, we see if the agency that 
enforces the statute has interpreted the ambiguity.”  Id.  The court found 
that the language “any individual” within the statute could reasonably be 
interpreted to mean current employee or job applicant.  Id. at 1293.  Before 
turning to the agency’s reading, the court considered multiple arguments 
to emphasize that § 4(a)(2) could be read more than one way.  Id.  The 
court considered a 1971 Title VII case that analyzed language parallel to 
that of § 4(a)(2).  Id. at 1293–94.  The case did not directly conclude 
whether the identical language covered job applicants.  Id. at 1295.  The 
court also noted that in 1971 Congress amended the parallel language in 
Title VII to add “or applicants for employment,” but did not amend 
§ 4(a)(2) of the ADEA.  Id. at 1295.  Yet, the court chose not to make 
assumptions about Congress’s intentions.  Id. at 1296.  Next, the court 
noted that other parts of the ADEA distinguish between employee and 
applicant.  Id.  However, the court reasoned that the specific use of the 
term “any individual” in § 4(a)(2) may be broad enough to include 
applicants.  Id. at 1297.  Ultimately, because the text of § 4(a)(2) did not 
provide clarity on the issue, the court turned towards the Equal 
Employment Opportunity’s (EEOC) current ADEA disparate impact 
regulation.  Id. at 1299.  The EEOC does not distinguish between 
prospective and existing employees.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA 
applies to job applicants because it is consistent with the longstanding 
position and interpretation of the EEOC.  Id. at 1303. 
 
Washington v. SSA, 806 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: What is the “standard that federal courts apply when 
reviewing the Appeals Council’s refusal to consider additional evidence 
submitted by the claimant” following the Commissioner of Social 
Security’s denial of disability insurance and supplemental security 
income?  Id. at 1320–21. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit noted that the 10th, 7th, and 8th Circuits 
previously held that “whether evidence meets the new, material, and 
chronologically relevant standard is a question of law” subject to de novo 
review.  Id. at 1321 (internal quotations omitted).  The 11th Circuit did not 
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engage in any analysis on the issue, but rather stated that it was in 
agreement with their sister circuits.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “when the Appeals Council 
erroneously refuses to consider evidence, it commits legal error and 
remand is appropriate.”  Id. 
 
 
 
